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Introduction
Following the global financial crisis of 2007-08, most major central banks have
embarked upon so-called unconventional monetary policies. These policies
feature monetary easing aimed at keeping interest rates at ultra-low levels.
Most notably, the Federal Reserve kept for over eight years interest rates
at the zero lower-bound with large-scale asset purchases of Treasuries and
mortgage-backed securities. European Central Bank followed suit with such
purchases and so did the Bank of Japan.
These unconventional monetary policies have spurred risk-taking in fi-
nancial markets. Notably, non-bank financial institutions have increasingly
engaged into (unregulated) maturity transformation, rolling over short-term
liabilities in order to fund flows into risky asset classes that include junk
bonds and collateralized leveraged loans, residential mortgage-backed as-
sets (Stein 2013), and emerging-market government and corporate bonds
(Acharya and Vij 2016, Bruno and Shin 2014, Feroli et al. 2014). IMF
GFSR (2016) documents that the presence of such a “risk-taking channel”
in the non-bank finance (insurance companies, pension funds and asset man-
agers) implies that monetary policy remains potent in aﬀecting economic and
financial outcomes even when banks face strict macroeconomic regulation.
Non-financial corporations have also increasingly engaged into financial
risk-taking. The US corporate sector has raised $7.8 trillion in debt over
the 2010-2017 period, whereas net equity issuance has been negative due to
payouts to shareholders that are at a high point compared with historical
averages. As a result corporate leverage is close to historical highs for large
firms1, and has more broadly risen to levels exceeding those prevailing just
1There is significant heterogeneity across sectors, but median net debt across S&P 500
firms is close to an all-time maximum.
2
before the global financial crisis (IMF 2017).
Several observers and policymakers lament the disappointing impact of
such financial risk-taking and of the resulting compression of risk premia on
capital expenditures.2 Investment has not returned yet to its pre-recession
trends despite a large wedge between low interest rates and historically high
realized rates of return on existing capital.3 Rather than being reinvested,
these high returns on capital have fuelled an increase in firms’ payout to their
shareholders, notably in the form of share repurchases (Furman 2015).
Motivated by these facts, this paper develops a simple model in which
three features jointly arise in equilibrium: i) a low policy rate, ii) a surge in
leverage and maturity transformation (“carry trades”) leading to the build-up
of financial fragility, and iii) an increase in the fraction of firms’ profits that
are paid out at the expense of productive investment despite a marginal rate
of return on capital above the policy rate. Even though these three features
have amplified following the 2008 crisis, they could actually be discerned ear-
lier on. For example, Gutie´rrez and Philippon (2017) argue that starting in
the early 2000s, US fixed investment has been a decreasing fraction of firms’
profits despite a high Tobin’s q, and that this coincided with an increase in
2See, in particular, Rajan (2013): “If eﬀective, the combination of the “low for long”
policy for short term policy rates coupled with quantitative easing tends to depress yields.
. . . Fixed income investors with minimum nominal return needs then migrate to riskier
instruments such as junk bonds, emerging market bonds, or commodity ETFs. . . . [T]his
reach for yield is precisely one of the intended consequences of unconventional monetary
policy. The hope is that as the price of risk is reduced, corporations faced with a lower cost
of capital will have greater incentive to make real investments, thereby creating jobs and
enhancing growth. . . . There are two ways these calculations can go wrong. First, financial
risk-taking may stay just that, without translating into real investment. For instance, the
price of junk debt or homes may be bid up unduly, increasing the risk of a crash, without
new capital goods being bought or homes being built. . . . Second, and probably a lesser
worry, accommodative policies may reduce the cost of capital for firms so much that they
prefer labor-saving capital investment to hiring labor.”
3Return on capital measured as private capital income divided by the private capital
stock as in Furman (2015).
3
share buybacks.4 Taylor (2011, 2012) traces the start of a “Great Deviation”
around the same date, whereby monetary policy became relatively more ac-
commodative than in the previous decades, and prudential regulation looser.
Taylor argues that this has significantly contributed to the build-up of fi-
nancial fragility leading to the 2008 crisis. To be sure, this latter point is
contentious (see, e.g., Bernanke 2010 for an alternative viewpoint).
Gist of the argument
Consider an economy with two dates t ∈ {0; 1} comprised of households and
a unit mass of entrepreneurs. Competitive households inelastically supply
savings S that they can invest in government bonds yielding a gross return
r. They can also lend to entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur is penniless and
owns a technology that transforms I date-0 consumption units into 2
√
I
date-1 units. Entrepreneurs have risk-neutral preferences c0 + c1/R, where
R is their (gross) discount rate over future consumption, such that SR2 > 2.
Entrepreneurs produce optimally at a marginal productivity of r reached
when they invest I = 1/r2 in their technology. Optimal consumption requires
that entrepreneurs postpone consumption to date 1 if r ≥ R, in which case
households invest S − I = S − 1/r2 in government bonds. If r < R, then
entrepreneurs front-load at date 0 the consumption of their date-1 profits
2
√
I − rI = 1/r, thereby borrowing a total date-0 amount 1/r2 + I = 2/r2.
Demand for government bonds thus shrinks to S − 2/r2. If r ≤ 󰁳2/S,
entrepreneurs are however constrained. They borrow S and split it between
consumption and productive investment so as to be marginally indiﬀerent,
in which case I = 1/R2.
4Gutie´rrez and Philippon (2017) argue that this evolution owes to a decline in the degree
of competition in US product markets. We view this explanation as complementary to
ours.
4
Borrowing by entrepreneurs against their future profits when r < R ad-
mits a straightforward interpretation as leveraged share buybacks. The cor-
porations set by entrepreneurs borrow in order to repurchase shares from
these entrepreneurs and cancel the shares.
Figure 1 illustrates how savings S are used towards productive invest-
ment, leveraged share buybacks, and investment in government bonds as r
varies:
Figure 1: Deployment of savings as      varies 
S
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Productive investment 
Government bonds 
Leveraged buybacks 
S
2<latexit sha1_base64="bzfKB/gA6HaHePnkyWzinoUqwys=">AA AB8nicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4KkkR9Fj04rGi/YA2lM120y7dbMLuRCghP8OLB0W8+mu8+W/ctjlo64OBx3szzMwLEikMuu63s7a+ sbm1Xdop7+7tHxxWjo7bJk414y0Wy1h3A2q4FIq3UKDk3URzGgWSd4LJ7czvPHFtRKwecZpwP6IjJULBKFqp1w81ZdlDntXzQaXq1tw5yC rxClKFAs1B5as/jFkacYVMUmN6npugn1GNgkmel/up4QllEzriPUsVjbjxs/nJOTm3ypCEsbalkMzV3xMZjYyZRoHtjCiOzbI3E//zeimG1 34mVJIiV2yxKEwlwZjM/idDoTlDObWEMi3srYSNqU0BbUplG4K3/PIqaddrnlvz7i+rjZsijhKcwhlcgAdX0IA7aEILGMTwDK/w5qDz4rw 7H4vWNaeYOYE/cD5/AG1QkVU=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="bzfKB/gA6HaHePnkyWzinoUqwys=">AA AB8nicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4KkkR9Fj04rGi/YA2lM120y7dbMLuRCghP8OLB0W8+mu8+W/ctjlo64OBx3szzMwLEikMuu63s7a+ sbm1Xdop7+7tHxxWjo7bJk414y0Wy1h3A2q4FIq3UKDk3URzGgWSd4LJ7czvPHFtRKwecZpwP6IjJULBKFqp1w81ZdlDntXzQaXq1tw5yC rxClKFAs1B5as/jFkacYVMUmN6npugn1GNgkmel/up4QllEzriPUsVjbjxs/nJOTm3ypCEsbalkMzV3xMZjYyZRoHtjCiOzbI3E//zeimG1 34mVJIiV2yxKEwlwZjM/idDoTlDObWEMi3srYSNqU0BbUplG4K3/PIqaddrnlvz7i+rjZsijhKcwhlcgAdX0IA7aEILGMTwDK/w5qDz4rw 7H4vWNaeYOYE/cD5/AG1QkVU=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="bzfKB/gA6HaHePnkyWzinoUqwys=">AA AB8nicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4KkkR9Fj04rGi/YA2lM120y7dbMLuRCghP8OLB0W8+mu8+W/ctjlo64OBx3szzMwLEikMuu63s7a+ sbm1Xdop7+7tHxxWjo7bJk414y0Wy1h3A2q4FIq3UKDk3URzGgWSd4LJ7czvPHFtRKwecZpwP6IjJULBKFqp1w81ZdlDntXzQaXq1tw5yC rxClKFAs1B5as/jFkacYVMUmN6npugn1GNgkmel/up4QllEzriPUsVjbjxs/nJOTm3ypCEsbalkMzV3xMZjYyZRoHtjCiOzbI3E//zeimG1 34mVJIiV2yxKEwlwZjM/idDoTlDObWEMi3srYSNqU0BbUplG4K3/PIqaddrnlvz7i+rjZsijhKcwhlcgAdX0IA7aEILGMTwDK/w5qDz4rw 7H4vWNaeYOYE/cD5/AG1QkVU=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="bzfKB/gA6HaHePnkyWzinoUqwys=">AA AB8nicbVBNS8NAEJ34WetX1aOXxSJ4KkkR9Fj04rGi/YA2lM120y7dbMLuRCghP8OLB0W8+mu8+W/ctjlo64OBx3szzMwLEikMuu63s7a+ sbm1Xdop7+7tHxxWjo7bJk414y0Wy1h3A2q4FIq3UKDk3URzGgWSd4LJ7czvPHFtRKwecZpwP6IjJULBKFqp1w81ZdlDntXzQaXq1tw5yC rxClKFAs1B5as/jFkacYVMUmN6npugn1GNgkmel/up4QllEzriPUsVjbjxs/nJOTm3ypCEsbalkMzV3xMZjYyZRoHtjCiOzbI3E//zeimG1 34mVJIiV2yxKEwlwZjM/idDoTlDObWEMi3srYSNqU0BbUplG4K3/PIqaddrnlvz7i+rjZsijhKcwhlcgAdX0IA7aEILGMTwDK/w5qDz4rw 7H4vWNaeYOYE/cD5/AG1QkVU=</latexit>
1
R2
<latexit sha1_base64="oAqWqMWFGY4ooj5ZZ4Hm60BirHk=">AA AB9HicbVBNSwMxEJ2tX7V+VT16CRbBU9kUQY9FLx6r2A9o15JNs21oNrsm2UJZ9nd48aCIV3+MN/+NabsHbX0w8Hhvhpl5fiy4Nq777RTW1j c2t4rbpZ3dvf2D8uFRS0eJoqxJIxGpjk80E1yypuFGsE6sGAl9wdr++GbmtydMaR7JBzONmReSoeQBp8RYyesFitAUZ+n9Yy3rlytu1Z0Dr RKckwrkaPTLX71BRJOQSUMF0bqL3dh4KVGGU8GyUi/RLCZ0TIasa6kkIdNeOj86Q2dWGaAgUrakQXP190RKQq2noW87Q2JGetmbif953cQEV 17KZZwYJuliUZAIZCI0SwANuGLUiKklhCpub0V0RGwOxuZUsiHg5ZdXSatWxW4V311U6td5HEU4gVM4BwyXUIdbaEATKDzBM7zCmzNxXpx3 52PRWnDymWP4A+fzB5brkfc=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="oAqWqMWFGY4ooj5ZZ4Hm60BirHk=">AA AB9HicbVBNSwMxEJ2tX7V+VT16CRbBU9kUQY9FLx6r2A9o15JNs21oNrsm2UJZ9nd48aCIV3+MN/+NabsHbX0w8Hhvhpl5fiy4Nq777RTW1j c2t4rbpZ3dvf2D8uFRS0eJoqxJIxGpjk80E1yypuFGsE6sGAl9wdr++GbmtydMaR7JBzONmReSoeQBp8RYyesFitAUZ+n9Yy3rlytu1Z0Dr RKckwrkaPTLX71BRJOQSUMF0bqL3dh4KVGGU8GyUi/RLCZ0TIasa6kkIdNeOj86Q2dWGaAgUrakQXP190RKQq2noW87Q2JGetmbif953cQEV 17KZZwYJuliUZAIZCI0SwANuGLUiKklhCpub0V0RGwOxuZUsiHg5ZdXSatWxW4V311U6td5HEU4gVM4BwyXUIdbaEATKDzBM7zCmzNxXpx3 52PRWnDymWP4A+fzB5brkfc=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="oAqWqMWFGY4ooj5ZZ4Hm60BirHk=">AA AB9HicbVBNSwMxEJ2tX7V+VT16CRbBU9kUQY9FLx6r2A9o15JNs21oNrsm2UJZ9nd48aCIV3+MN/+NabsHbX0w8Hhvhpl5fiy4Nq777RTW1j c2t4rbpZ3dvf2D8uFRS0eJoqxJIxGpjk80E1yypuFGsE6sGAl9wdr++GbmtydMaR7JBzONmReSoeQBp8RYyesFitAUZ+n9Yy3rlytu1Z0Dr RKckwrkaPTLX71BRJOQSUMF0bqL3dh4KVGGU8GyUi/RLCZ0TIasa6kkIdNeOj86Q2dWGaAgUrakQXP190RKQq2noW87Q2JGetmbif953cQEV 17KZZwYJuliUZAIZCI0SwANuGLUiKklhCpub0V0RGwOxuZUsiHg5ZdXSatWxW4V311U6td5HEU4gVM4BwyXUIdbaEATKDzBM7zCmzNxXpx3 52PRWnDymWP4A+fzB5brkfc=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="oAqWqMWFGY4ooj5ZZ4Hm60BirHk=">AA AB9HicbVBNSwMxEJ2tX7V+VT16CRbBU9kUQY9FLx6r2A9o15JNs21oNrsm2UJZ9nd48aCIV3+MN/+NabsHbX0w8Hhvhpl5fiy4Nq777RTW1j c2t4rbpZ3dvf2D8uFRS0eJoqxJIxGpjk80E1yypuFGsE6sGAl9wdr++GbmtydMaR7JBzONmReSoeQBp8RYyesFitAUZ+n9Yy3rlytu1Z0Dr RKckwrkaPTLX71BRJOQSUMF0bqL3dh4KVGGU8GyUi/RLCZ0TIasa6kkIdNeOj86Q2dWGaAgUrakQXP190RKQq2noW87Q2JGetmbif953cQEV 17KZZwYJuliUZAIZCI0SwANuGLUiKklhCpub0V0RGwOxuZUsiHg5ZdXSatWxW4V311U6td5HEU4gVM4BwyXUIdbaEATKDzBM7zCmzNxXpx3 52PRWnDymWP4A+fzB5brkfc=</latexit>
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Values of 
r
<latexit sha1_base64="D+vIjYIYiuYBqfGNJBmXYbUZJb0=">AAAB6HicbVBNS 8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEqMeiF48t2A9oQ9lsJ+3azSbsboQS+gu8eFDEqz/Jm//GbZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8IBFcG9f9dgobm1vbO8Xd0t7+weFR+fikreNUMWyxWMSqG1C NgktsGW4EdhOFNAoEdoLJ3dzvPKHSPJYPZpqgH9GR5CFn1FipqQblilt1FyDrxMtJBXI0BuWv/jBmaYTSMEG17nluYvyMKsOZwFmpn2pMKJvQEfYslTRC7WeLQ2fkwipDE sbKljRkof6eyGik9TQKbGdEzVivenPxP6+XmvDGz7hMUoOSLReFqSAmJvOvyZArZEZMLaFMcXsrYWOqKDM2m5INwVt9eZ20r6qeW/Wa15X6bR5HEc7gHC7BgxrU4R4a0AI GCM/wCm/Oo/PivDsfy9aCk8+cwh84nz/dIYz2</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D+vIjYIYiuYBqfGNJBmXYbUZJb0=">AAAB6HicbVBNS 8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEqMeiF48t2A9oQ9lsJ+3azSbsboQS+gu8eFDEqz/Jm//GbZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8IBFcG9f9dgobm1vbO8Xd0t7+weFR+fikreNUMWyxWMSqG1C NgktsGW4EdhOFNAoEdoLJ3dzvPKHSPJYPZpqgH9GR5CFn1FipqQblilt1FyDrxMtJBXI0BuWv/jBmaYTSMEG17nluYvyMKsOZwFmpn2pMKJvQEfYslTRC7WeLQ2fkwipDE sbKljRkof6eyGik9TQKbGdEzVivenPxP6+XmvDGz7hMUoOSLReFqSAmJvOvyZArZEZMLaFMcXsrYWOqKDM2m5INwVt9eZ20r6qeW/Wa15X6bR5HEc7gHC7BgxrU4R4a0AI GCM/wCm/Oo/PivDsfy9aCk8+cwh84nz/dIYz2</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D+vIjYIYiuYBqfGNJBmXYbUZJb0=">AAAB6HicbVBNS 8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEqMeiF48t2A9oQ9lsJ+3azSbsboQS+gu8eFDEqz/Jm//GbZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8IBFcG9f9dgobm1vbO8Xd0t7+weFR+fikreNUMWyxWMSqG1C NgktsGW4EdhOFNAoEdoLJ3dzvPKHSPJYPZpqgH9GR5CFn1FipqQblilt1FyDrxMtJBXI0BuWv/jBmaYTSMEG17nluYvyMKsOZwFmpn2pMKJvQEfYslTRC7WeLQ2fkwipDE sbKljRkof6eyGik9TQKbGdEzVivenPxP6+XmvDGz7hMUoOSLReFqSAmJvOvyZArZEZMLaFMcXsrYWOqKDM2m5INwVt9eZ20r6qeW/Wa15X6bR5HEc7gHC7BgxrU4R4a0AI GCM/wCm/Oo/PivDsfy9aCk8+cwh84nz/dIYz2</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="D+vIjYIYiuYBqfGNJBmXYbUZJb0=">AAAB6HicbVBNS 8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lEqMeiF48t2A9oQ9lsJ+3azSbsboQS+gu8eFDEqz/Jm//GbZuDtj4YeLw3w8y8IBFcG9f9dgobm1vbO8Xd0t7+weFR+fikreNUMWyxWMSqG1C NgktsGW4EdhOFNAoEdoLJ3dzvPKHSPJYPZpqgH9GR5CFn1FipqQblilt1FyDrxMtJBXI0BuWv/jBmaYTSMEG17nluYvyMKsOZwFmpn2pMKJvQEfYslTRC7WeLQ2fkwipDE sbKljRkof6eyGik9TQKbGdEzVivenPxP6+XmvDGz7hMUoOSLReFqSAmJvOvyZArZEZMLaFMcXsrYWOqKDM2m5INwVt9eZ20r6qeW/Wa15X6bR5HEc7gHC7BgxrU4R4a0AI GCM/wCm/Oo/PivDsfy9aCk8+cwh84nz/dIYz2</latexit>
S <latexit sha1_base64="UUihRRRWgqRHJIqtQNGTJN/yvV0=">AAAB6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8cW7Qe0oWy2k3btZhN2N0IJ/QVePCji1Z/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZekAiujet+O4W19Y3NreJ2aWd3b/+gfHjU0nGqGDZZLGLVCahGwSU2DTcCO4lCGgUC28H4dua3n1BpHssHM0nQj+hQ8pAzaqzUuO+XK27VnYOsEi8nFchR75e/eoOYpRFKwwTVuuu5ifEzqgxnAqelXqoxoWxMh9i1VNIItZ/ND52SM6sMSBgrW9KQufp7IqOR1pMosJ0RNSO97M3E/7xuasJrP+MySQ1KtlgUpoKYmMy+JgOukBkxsYQyxe2thI2ooszYbEo2BG/55VXSuqh6btVrXFZqN3kcRTiBUzgHD66gBndQhyYwQHiGV3hzHp0X5935WLQWnHzmGP7A+fwBriWM1w==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="UUihRRRWgqRHJIqtQNGTJN/yvV0=">AAAB6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8cW7Qe0oWy2k3btZhN2N0IJ/QVePCji1Z/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZekAiujet+O4W19Y3NreJ2aWd3b/+gfHjU0nGqGDZZLGLVCahGwSU2DTcCO4lCGgUC28H4dua3n1BpHssHM0nQj+hQ8pAzaqzUuO+XK27VnYOsEi8nFchR75e/eoOYpRFKwwTVuuu5ifEzqgxnAqelXqoxoWxMh9i1VNIItZ/ND52SM6sMSBgrW9KQufp7IqOR1pMosJ0RNSO97M3E/7xuasJrP+MySQ1KtlgUpoKYmMy+JgOukBkxsYQyxe2thI2ooszYbEo2BG/55VXSuqh6btVrXFZqN3kcRTiBUzgHD66gBndQhyYwQHiGV3hzHp0X5935WLQWnHzmGP7A+fwBriWM1w==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="UUihRRRWgqRHJIqtQNGTJN/yvV0=">AAAB6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8cW7Qe0oWy2k3btZhN2N0IJ/QVePCji1Z/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZekAiujet+O4W19Y3NreJ2aWd3b/+gfHjU0nGqGDZZLGLVCahGwSU2DTcCO4lCGgUC28H4dua3n1BpHssHM0nQj+hQ8pAzaqzUuO+XK27VnYOsEi8nFchR75e/eoOYpRFKwwTVuuu5ifEzqgxnAqelXqoxoWxMh9i1VNIItZ/ND52SM6sMSBgrW9KQufp7IqOR1pMosJ0RNSO97M3E/7xuasJrP+MySQ1KtlgUpoKYmMy+JgOukBkxsYQyxe2thI2ooszYbEo2BG/55VXSuqh6btVrXFZqN3kcRTiBUzgHD66gBndQhyYwQHiGV3hzHp0X5935WLQWnHzmGP7A+fwBriWM1w==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="UUihRRRWgqRHJIqtQNGTJN/yvV0=">AAAB6HicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69LBbBU0lE0GPRi8cW7Qe0oWy2k3btZhN2N0IJ/QVePCji1Z/kzX/jts1BWx8MPN6bYWZekAiujet+O4W19Y3NreJ2aWd3b/+gfHjU0nGqGDZZLGLVCahGwSU2DTcCO4lCGgUC28H4dua3n1BpHssHM0nQj+hQ8pAzaqzUuO+XK27VnYOsEi8nFchR75e/eoOYpRFKwwTVuuu5ifEzqgxnAqelXqoxoWxMh9i1VNIItZ/ND52SM6sMSBgrW9KQufp7IqOR1pMosJ0RNSO97M3E/7xuasJrP+MySQ1KtlgUpoKYmMy+JgOukBkxsYQyxe2thI2ooszYbEo2BG/55VXSuqh6btVrXFZqN3kcRTiBUzgHD66gBndQhyYwQHiGV3hzHp0X5935WLQWnHzmGP7A+fwBriWM1w==</latexit>
0	 +1
<latexit sha1_base64="uoZ90eZQRaUhR4Bv/kZtwovgOI4=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69 LBZBEEoigh6LXjxWsB/QhrLZbtqlm03YnQgh9Ed48aCIV3+PN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5QSKFQdf9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCobeJUM95isYx1N6CGS6F4CwVK3k00p1EgeSeY3M38zhPXRsTqEbOE+xEdKREK RtFKnYu+UCFmg2rNrbtzkFXiFaQGBZqD6ld/GLM04gqZpMb0PDdBP6caBZN8WumnhieUTeiI9yxVNOLGz+fnTsmZVYYkjLUthWSu/p7IaWRMFgW2M6I4NsveTPzP66UY3vi5UEmKXLHFojCVBGMy+50MheYMZWY JZVrYWwkbU00Z2oQqNgRv+eVV0r6se27de7iqNW6LOMpwAqdwDh5cQwPuoQktYDCBZ3iFNydxXpx352PRWnKKmWP4A+fzBylaj3E=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="uoZ90eZQRaUhR4Bv/kZtwovgOI4=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69 LBZBEEoigh6LXjxWsB/QhrLZbtqlm03YnQgh9Ed48aCIV3+PN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5QSKFQdf9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCobeJUM95isYx1N6CGS6F4CwVK3k00p1EgeSeY3M38zhPXRsTqEbOE+xEdKREK RtFKnYu+UCFmg2rNrbtzkFXiFaQGBZqD6ld/GLM04gqZpMb0PDdBP6caBZN8WumnhieUTeiI9yxVNOLGz+fnTsmZVYYkjLUthWSu/p7IaWRMFgW2M6I4NsveTPzP66UY3vi5UEmKXLHFojCVBGMy+50MheYMZWY JZVrYWwkbU00Z2oQqNgRv+eVV0r6se27de7iqNW6LOMpwAqdwDh5cQwPuoQktYDCBZ3iFNydxXpx352PRWnKKmWP4A+fzBylaj3E=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="uoZ90eZQRaUhR4Bv/kZtwovgOI4=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69 LBZBEEoigh6LXjxWsB/QhrLZbtqlm03YnQgh9Ed48aCIV3+PN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5QSKFQdf9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCobeJUM95isYx1N6CGS6F4CwVK3k00p1EgeSeY3M38zhPXRsTqEbOE+xEdKREK RtFKnYu+UCFmg2rNrbtzkFXiFaQGBZqD6ld/GLM04gqZpMb0PDdBP6caBZN8WumnhieUTeiI9yxVNOLGz+fnTsmZVYYkjLUthWSu/p7IaWRMFgW2M6I4NsveTPzP66UY3vi5UEmKXLHFojCVBGMy+50MheYMZWY JZVrYWwkbU00Z2oQqNgRv+eVV0r6se27de7iqNW6LOMpwAqdwDh5cQwPuoQktYDCBZ3iFNydxXpx352PRWnKKmWP4A+fzBylaj3E=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="uoZ90eZQRaUhR4Bv/kZtwovgOI4=">AAAB7nicbVBNS8NAEJ3Ur1q/qh69 LBZBEEoigh6LXjxWsB/QhrLZbtqlm03YnQgh9Ed48aCIV3+PN/+N2zYHbX0w8Hhvhpl5QSKFQdf9dkpr6xubW+Xtys7u3v5B9fCobeJUM95isYx1N6CGS6F4CwVK3k00p1EgeSeY3M38zhPXRsTqEbOE+xEdKREK RtFKnYu+UCFmg2rNrbtzkFXiFaQGBZqD6ld/GLM04gqZpMb0PDdBP6caBZN8WumnhieUTeiI9yxVNOLGz+fnTsmZVYYkjLUthWSu/p7IaWRMFgW2M6I4NsveTPzP66UY3vi5UEmKXLHFojCVBGMy+50MheYMZWY JZVrYWwkbU00Z2oQqNgRv+eVV0r6se27de7iqNW6LOMpwAqdwDh5cQwPuoQktYDCBZ3iFNydxXpx352PRWnKKmWP4A+fzBylaj3E=</latexit>
For r ≥ R (1/r2 ≤ 1/R2), savings are only channeled towards productive
investment (dashed area) and government bond purchases (dotted area). As
r < R (1/r2 > 1/R2), every unit of productive investment is matched by
a unit of leveraged share buybacks. Entrepreneurs’ demand for funds thus
grows twice as fast with 1/r2 as when r ≥ R. This implies that productive
investment reaches a maximum S/2 when all savings are directed towards
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the private sector. Past this maximum, productive investment drops back
to 1/R2 as the required return on it reflects entrepreneurs’ borrowing con-
straints, and residual savings fuel a large amount of leveraged share buybacks.
The paper formalizes such a crowding out of productive investment by
leveraged payouts to shareholders in a richer model that includes the follow-
ing ingredients.
1. General equilibrium. Quantities of consumption goods and assets are
endogenous equilibrium outcomes.
2. Constrained-eﬃcient public policy. A central bank with full fiscal back-
ing controls the real rate on public bonds. It seeks this way to mitigate
the distortions induced by rigid (fixed) prices in order to maximize a
standard social welfare function.
3. Imperfect enforcement. It is easy to see in the above elementary model
that an appropriate cap on entrepreneurs’ debt-to-assets ratio imple-
ments more productive investment than in the unregulated case by pre-
cluding leveraged share buybacks. Our main model by contrast posits
the key assumption that it is not possible to regulate private leverage
this way. This simply captures the existence of a large shadow-banking
system that can fund corporate debt outside the scope of banking reg-
ulation. In other words, we argue in this paper that the rise of a large
shadow-banking system is a major reason monetary easing has led to
less investment and more financial risk-taking over the last decades.
4. Maturity transformation and liquidity risk. The main model also fea-
tures market incompleteness. Entrepreneurs can only issue debt that
has a shorter maturity than that of their projects. This implies that
they must expose themselves to rollover risk when investing or buying
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shares back. This is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, rollover
risk makes leveraged share buybacks less appealing to them for mod-
erate levels of monetary easing, thereby mitigating the crowding out
of productive investment. On the other hand, when the policy rate is
suﬃciently low that entrepreneurs find such carry trades profitable, the
monetary authority must implement a lending of last resort policy in
order to avoid ineﬃcient liquidation of entrepreneurs’ projects.
5. Redistributive implications. Finally, as in the above elementary model,
monetary easing channels savings from public bonds towards the pri-
vate sector in the main model. In an overlapping-generations environ-
ment, the public sector makes up for its resulting smaller resources by
taxing old households. Leveraged share buybacks thus lead to trans-
fers to young entrepreneurs from old households. Whereas we posit
that such transfers are welfare-neutral for simplicity, our results would
be reinforced if the social welfare function was penalizing them (for
example for political-economy reasons).
The paper is organized as follows. As a stepping stone, Section 1 presents
a simple version of our model without maturity transformation. Section
2 tackles the full-fledged model and derives our main results. Section 3
discusses some extensions. Section 4 presents the concluding remarks.
Related literature
Caballero and Farhi (2017) also build a model in which disequilibrium in the
market for the risk-free asset plays a central role. Combined with borrowing
constraints, it leads to an ineﬃciently low output in their setup. One impor-
tant diﬀerence between their setting and ours is that disequilibrium in their
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model stems from an exogenous lower bound on the risk-free rate (the zero
lower bound). By contrast, we exhibit an endogenous lower bound on the
risk-free rate, below which leverage share buybacks crowd out productive in-
vestment, leading it to collapse. Whereas the zero lower bound has arguably
been the important binding constraint in the couple of years following the
2008 crisis, we believe that the endogenous lower bound that we obtain may
have played a central role in the build-up of financial fragility leading to the
2008 crisis. This endogenous lower bound may also help understand the cur-
rent patterns of reduced investment rates, increased payouts to shareholders,
and growing leverage and maturity transformation.
Other recent contributions that study the negative impact of low policy
rates on financial stability rely on the lack of commitment of the public sec-
tor. In Farhi and Tirole (2012), the central bank cannot commit not to lower
interest rates when financial sector’s maturity transformation goes awry. In
anticipation, the financial sector finds it optimal to engage in maturity trans-
formation to exploit the central bank’s “put”. In Diamond and Rajan (2012),
the rollover risk in short-term claims disciplines banks from excessive matu-
rity transformation, but the inability of the central bank to commit not to
“bailing out” short-term claims removes the market discipline, inducing ex-
cessive illiquidity-seeking by banks. They propose raising rates in good times
taking account of financial-stability concerns, so as to avoid distortions from
having to raise rates when banks are distressed.
In contrast to these papers, in our model, the central bank faces no com-
mitment problem; it finds low rates attractive up to a point for stimulating
productive investment but lowering rates beyond triggers maturity transfor-
mation beyond socially useful levels, and crowds out productive real invest-
ment.
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Several recent contributions suggest alternative channels for the limited
impact of low interest rates on investment. Brunnermeier and Koby (2018)
show that this may stem from eroded lending margins in an environment
of imperfectly competitive banks. Coimbra and Rey (2017) study a model
in which the financial sector is comprised of institutions with varying risk
appetites. Starting from a low interest rate, further monetary easing may
increase financial instability, thereby creating a trade-oﬀ with the need to
stimulate the economy. Quadrini (2017) develops a model in which monetary
easing in the form of private asset purchases may have a contractionary
impact on investment. In his setup, firms use deposits to hedge productivity
shocks. The claims of the public sector against private assets crowd out
those of the corporate sector thereby reducing the corporate sector’s ability
to take on productivity risk. A distinctive feature of our approach is that
we jointly explain low investment, high payouts, and the growth of maturity
transformation within the shadow-banking sector.
Acharya and Naqvi (2012a, b) develop a model of internal agency prob-
lem in financial firms due to limited liability wherein liquidity shortfalls on
maturity transformation serve to align insiders’ incentives with those of out-
siders. When aggregate liquidity at rollover date is abundant, such alignment
is restricted accentuating agency conflicts, leading to excessive lending and
fueling of asset-price bubbles. Easy monetary policy only exacerbates this
problem. Stein (2012) explains that the prudential regulation of banks can
partly rein in incentives to engage in maturity transformation that is so-
cially suboptimal due to fire-sale externalities; however, there is always some
unchecked growth of such activity in shadow banking and monetary policy
that leans against the wind can be optimal as it raises the cost of borrow-
ing in all “cracks” of the financial sector. The key diﬀerence between our
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model and these two papers is that excessive maturity transformation arises
in our model not due to agency problems in the financial sector nor due to
fire-sale externalities, but from monetary easing rightly aimed at stimulating
aggregate output.
Finally, as we argue in Section 3.2, our results are reinforced if redis-
tributive concerns reduce the public sector’s fiscal space. This is our point
of contact with the literature that studies how real-rate manipulation by a
monetary authority aﬀects the real economy via redistributive eﬀects (see,
e.g., Auclert 2017 and the references herein).
1 An elementary model of monetary easing
Setup
Time is discrete. There are two types of private agents, workers and en-
trepreneurs, and a public sector. There are two goods that private agents
find desirable: a perishable consumption good that serves as nume´raire and
a capital good.
Capital good. One unit of capital good produced at date t generates one
unit of the consumption good at date t+ 1. That the capital good need not
be combined with labor at date t + 1 in order to deliver the consumption
good is for analytical simplicity, and plays no material role in our results.
This also entails that the capital good can alternatively be interpreted as a
durable good such as housing. We deem date-t investment the number of
units of capital goods produced at this date.
Workers. At each date, a unit mass of workers are born and live for two
dates. They derive utility from consumption only when old, and are risk-
neutral over consumption. Each worker supplies inelastically one unit of
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labor when young in a competitive labor market. Each worker also owns a
technology that transforms l units of labor into g(l) contemporaneous units
of the consumption good, where the function g satisfies the Inada conditions.
Entrepreneurs. At each date, a unit mass of entrepreneurs are born and
live for two dates. They are risk-neutral over consumption at each date and
do not discount future consumption. Each entrepreneur born at date t is
endowed with a technology that transforms l units of labor at date t into
f(l) contemporaneous units of the capital good. This capital delivers f(l)
units of the consumption good at the next date t+1. The function f satisfies
the Inada conditions.
Public sector. The public sector does not consume. It maximizes the
sum of the utilities of agents in the private sector, discounting that of future
generations with a factor arbitrarily close to 1.
Bond market. There is a competitive market for one-period risk-free bonds
denominated in the nume´raire good.
Monetary policy. The public sector announces at each date an interest
rate at which it is willing to trade bonds.
Fiscal policy. The public sector can tax workers as it sees fit. It can,
in particular, apply lump-sum taxes. On the other hand, it cannot tax en-
trepreneurs nor regulate them. This latter assumption is made stark in order
to yield a simple and clear exposition of our results.
Figure 2 summarizes the timing of events for a typical cohort.
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Figure 2: Timeline 
•  Public sector and entrepreneurs repay date-t bonds 
•  Public sector taxes old workers 
•  Old workers consume their after-tax income from 
bonds 
•  Entrepreneurs possibly consume 
•  Public sector announces an interest rate 
•  Young workers: 
•   supply labor 
•  Invest profits and wages in bonds 
issued by the public sector and 
entrepreneurs 
 
•  Young entrepreneurs borrow to pay 
wages and possibly consume 
t
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Relationship to new Keynesian models. This setup can be described
as a much simplified version of a new Keynesian model in which money
serves only as a unit of account (“cashless economy”) and monetary policy
consists in enforcing the short-term nominal interest rate. Such monetary
policy has real eﬀects in the presence of nominal rigidities. We entirely focus
on these real eﬀects, and fully abstract from price-level determination by
assuming extreme nominal rigidities in the form of a fixed price level for
the consumption good. This will enable us to introduce ingredients that are
typically absent from mainstream monetary models in a tractable framework
in the following. In recent contributions, Benmelech and Bergman (2012),
Caballero and Simsek (2017) or Farhi and Tirole (2012) also focus on the
financial-stability implications of monetary policy abstracting from price-
level determination as we do.
Steady state
We study steady states in which the public sector announces a constant gross
interest rate r. We suppose that the public sector oﬀsets its net position in
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the bond market at each date with a lump-sum tax or rebate on current
old workers. We denote w the market wage, and l ∈ [0, 1] the quantity of
labor that young workers supply to young entrepreneurs. The steady-state
values of r, w and l determine the respectives surpluses of entrepreneurs and
workers as follows:
Entrepreneurs. Young entrepreneurs borrow wl to pay the corresponding
wages.5 If r < 1, entrepreneurs borrow the additional amount (f(l)− rwl)/r
against their next-date profit f(l) − rwl in order to consume when young.
They consume this profit f(l)− rwl when old if r ≥ 1.
Workers. Young workers’ income is comprised of labor income in the
capital-good sector wl, labor income in the consumption-good sector w(1−l),
and profits from the consumption-good sector g(1 − l) − w(1 − l). Work-
ers invest the resulting total income g(1 − l) + wl in private and public
bonds thereby receiving a pre-tax income r[g(1 − l) + wl] when old. The
share of their income that young workers invest in public bonds is equal
to their total income g(1 − l) + wl net of young entrepreneurs’ borrowing
wl + {r<1} (f(l)/r − wl). The government rebates to old workers at each
date this investment in public bonds by contemporaneous young workers net
of the repayment of maturing bonds.
The surplus of a given cohort is therefore:
5This is just a convention and not a wage-in-advance constraint: the analysis is verbatim
if entrepreneurs pay wages by directly granting units of capital to their employees.
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󰀗
1 + {r<1}
󰀕
1
r
− 1
󰀖󰀘
(f(l)− rwl)󰁿 󰁾󰁽 󰂀
Entrepreneurs’ surplus
+ rwl + rg(1− l)󰁿 󰁾󰁽 󰂀
Old workers’ pre-tax income
+ (1− r)
󰀗
g(1− l)− {r<1}
󰀕
f(l)
r
− wl
󰀖󰀘
󰁿 󰁾󰁽 󰂀
Rebate to old workers
(1)
= f(l) + g(1− l). (2)
Furthermore, profit maximization by all firms implies:
g′(1− l) = w, (3)
f ′(l) = rw. (4)
Expression (2) implies that the public sector optimally maximizes total
output per cohort. This requires the consumption-good and capital-good
sectors to be equally productive at the margin. This corresponds in turn to
an employment level l∗ in the capital-good sector such that
g′(1− l∗) = f ′(l∗). (5)
From (3) and (4), the public sector can reach this outcome by setting the
interest rate to r∗ = 1. In this case, the market wage w∗ solves
w∗ = g′(1− l∗) = f ′(l∗) = r∗w∗, (6)
net bond issuance by the public sector, and thus taxes, are equal to zero.
The optimality of an interest rate equal to the (unit) growth rate of the
population is of course akin to the “golden rule” maximizing steady-state
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utility in overlapping-generations models.
Comments
Welfare irrelevance of leveraged share buybacks. As mentioned in the
introduction, borrowing by young entrepreneurs against their future profits
f(l) − rwl admits a straightforward interpretation as leveraged share buy-
backs.6 These leveraged share buybacks merely transfer consumption from
workers to entrepreneurs and are thus welfare-neutral given the assumed pref-
erences and social objective. Abstracting from redistributive concerns in this
way enables us to focus on the sole impact of leveraged share buybacks on
the aggregate private demand for funds. Importantly, as discussed in Section
3.2, redistributive concerns would only reinforce our results.
Private demand for funds. We characterize the steady state assuming
that entrepreneurs face no borrowing constraints at the prevailing interest
rate r. From Walras’ Law, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for this to
hold is that the public sector has enough fiscal capacity to balance its budget
given the net demand for public bonds at each date: The tax on old workers
that balances the budget cannot exceed their pre-tax income. By inspection
of (1), this is always the case when r ≥ 1, and so in particular at the optimal
rate r∗ = 1, as old workers receive a positive rebate in this case. On the other
hand, this might not hold when r is suﬃciently small other things being equal,
because young entrepreneurs’ borrowing might exceed the income that young
workers and the public sector (via taxation of old workers) can lend.7 We
will discuss in detail this situation of potential disequilibrium in the bond
6To be sure, nothing distinguishes share repurchases from dividends in our setting. We
prefer the interpretation of share buybacks because they better correspond in practice to
the one-shot large payouts that we will study in our main model.
7Formally, the tax on old workers that covers the public sector’s net issuance must be
smaller than their pre-tax income, which simplifies into (1− r)f(l) ≤ r[wl + g(1− l)].
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market in the more general model of Section 2. For brevity, we suppose
in this Section 1 that parameters are such that private agents face no such
borrowing constraints.
Monetary easing
Suppose now that one cohort of workers — the one born at date 0, say —
has a less productive technology than that of its predecessors and successors.
Unlike the other cohorts, their technology transforms x units of labor into
ρg(x) contemporaneous units of the consumption good, where ρ ∈ (0, 1).8
We first check that unsurprisingly, this productivity shock does not aﬀect
the optimal policy rate r∗ = 1 when the wage is flexible. We then introduce
a downward-rigid wage.
Flexible-wage benchmark
When the wage is flexible, the steady-state unit interest rate is still optimal
at all dates in the presence of such time-varying productivity. The date-
0 wage adjusts to a level w0 < w
∗ such that the employment level in the
capital-good sector l0 > l
∗ leads to more investment:
w0 = ρg
′(1− l0) = f ′(l0), (7)
and productive eﬃciency prevails at every date. Time-varying productivity
only has a redistributive eﬀect across cohorts as the old workers at date 0
must be taxed g(1−l∗)−ρg(1−l0) to balance the date-0 public-sector budget,
whereas old workers at date 1 receive the corresponding rebate.
8Note that whether this shock and the associated policy response are anticipated or
not by the predecessors of the date-0 cohort is immaterial.
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Rigid wage and optimal monetary policy
We now introduce nominal rigidities in order to create room for monetary
easing at date 0:
Assumption. (Downward rigid wage) The wage cannot be smaller than
w∗ at any date.
In other words, we suppose that the wage is too downward rigid to track
the transitory productivity shock that hits the date-0 cohort, and that the
public sector cannot regulate it in the short run. It is worthwhile stressing
that wage rigidity is short-lived: It lasts for one date only.9
Given that the capital-good sector is interest-rate sensitive whereas the
consumption-good sector is not, the public sector can make up for the absence
of appropriate price signals in the date-0 labor market by distorting the date-
0 capital market. By setting the date-0 policy rate at
r0 =
w0
w∗
, (8)
the public sector restores productive eﬃciency. Entrepreneurs invest up to
the optimal level l0 since
f ′(l0) = r0w∗ = w0. (9)
Each worker accommodates by applying in his own firm the residual quantity
of labor that the other firms are not willing to absorb at the prevailing market
wage w∗. He does so at a marginal return below wage (ρg′(1−l0) = w0 < w∗),
and produces at the socially optimal level by doing so.
9We could also assume a partial adjustment without aﬀecting the analysis. Note also
that the analysis would be similar if the date-0 productivity shock was permanent (“secular
stagnation”). All that would matter in this case would be the number of periods it takes
for the wage to adjust to the level w0 that is optimal given the productivity shock.
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Note that since r0 < 1, date-0 entrepreneurs enter into leveraged share
buybacks. This channels young workers’ funds out of public bonds into such
trades. As noticed before, the public sector must then have suﬃcient tax
capacity to make up for this temporarily reduced funding.10 Again, the case
in which this does not hold will be tackled in the more general context of the
following section. Absent such borrowing constraints, we have
Proposition 1. (Monetary easing) Setting the interest rate at r0 < 1 at
date 0 and at r∗ = 1 at other dates implements the flexible-wage outputs at
all dates and is therefore optimal.
Proof. See discussion above. 󰃈
More on the relationship to new Keynesian models. In the workhorse
new Keynesian framework, monetary policy serves both to pin down infla-
tion and to set the real interest rate at the “natural” level that would prevail
under flexible prices. Monetary policy in our framework plays the very same
latter role of mitigating distortions induced by nominal rigidities by gearing
real variables towards their “natural” levels. The natural level is not defined
by the intertemporal rate of substitution of a representative consumer here
(consumers are heterogeneous), but rather by the relative marginal produc-
tivities of two sectors.
This Section 1 has derived optimal monetary policy in our elementary
model of the interest-rate channel of monetary policy. Building on this
framework, the following section studies a richer environment in which en-
trepreneurs need to take on liquidity risk in order to take advantage of low
short-term interest rates when investing and buying shares back.
10Formally, the required taxes are lower than old workers’ pre-tax income at date 0 if
parameters are such that f(l0) ≤ r0(w∗l0 +w∗l∗ + ρg(1− l0)). This holds if, for example,
ρ is suﬃciently close to 1 and entrepreneurs’ profits are smaller than workers’ income in
the steady state.
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2 Monetary policy and financial instability
This section leaves the modelling of the public sector and that of workers
unchanged, but modifies the modelling of entrepreneurs and that of their
capital-good technology so that both investment and share buybacks involve
taking on liquidity risk.
Entrepreneurs’ preferences. We now assume that entrepreneurs live for
three dates, and value consumption at the initial and last dates of their lives.
They still are risk-neutral and do not discount future cash flows.11
Capital good. A unit of capital good produced at date t yields one unit
of consumption good at date t + 2. Alternatively, this unit of capital can
be liquidated at date t + 1, in which case it generates 1/(1 + λ) units of
consumption at this date, where λ > 0.
Liquidity risk. We still assume that agents can trade only one-period risk-
free bonds.12 An entrepreneur born at date t has access to the bond market
at date t + 1 with probability 1 − q only, where q ∈ (0, 1). Such market
exclusions are independent across entrepreneurs of the same cohort. This
simple modelling of liquidity risk follows Diamond (1997). We assume that
for all x ∈ (0, 1),13
f(x)
x
≥ [1 + λ(1− q)]f ′(x). (10)
Lending of last resort. In addition to monetary and fiscal instruments
11Assuming that entrepreneurs do not value consumption when middle-aged slightly
simplifies the exposition. Section 3.5 below explains how the introduction of interim
consumption actually reinforces our results.
12All that we need is that issuing two-period bonds against the capital good does not
dominate rolling over one-period bonds beyond some leverage ratio. This would be the
case if, for example, a fraction of workers incurred high transaction costs when selling
long-term bonds to consume after one period.
13This ensures that entrepreneurs’ debt capacity always exceeds their wage bill.
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identical to that in the previous section, the public sector can act as a
lender of last resort (LOLR) or emergency lender, oﬀering credit to the en-
trepreneurs who are excluded from the bond market at whichever conditions
it sees fit. So, the public sector announces both a rate at which it is willing
to trade in the bond market, and a rate at which it acts as a LOLR. We
deem the former rate the “policy rate” and the latter the “LOLR rate” in
the balance of the paper.
These modifications introduce the minimum set of ingredients required
to enrich the model of Section 1 as follows. First, both investment and share
buybacks by entrepreneurs involve taking on liquidity risk. Entrepreneurs
must fund their long-term cash flows with short-term debt (“carry trades”),
and this entails rollover risk. Entrepreneurs must liquidate ineﬃciently their
capital in case they are excluded from markets and need to refinance their
short-term debt. Second, the public sector can avoid such ineﬃcient liquida-
tion by acting as the LOLR.
Important remark: Financial intermediaries and non-financial firms.
In our model, the same type of agents, “entrepreneurs,” both enter into ma-
turity transformation and buy shares back for simplicity. To be sure, each ac-
tivity is carried out by diﬀerent types of agents in practice. In recent episodes
of monetary easing, increases in maturity transformation have mostly taken
place through the shadow-banking sector taking on maturity risk in order to
finance long-term corporate debt or real-estate investments.14 Non-financial
corporations have levered up issuing such long-term-debt in order to increase
payouts to shareholders. Section 3.1 shows that splitting the private sector
this way into financial intermediaries that engage into maturity transforma-
14Traditional banks of course perform maturity transformation, yet the size of their
balance sheets is significantly less sensitive to financial conditions than that of shadow
institutions.
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tion and firms that do not does not aﬀect our results.
As in the previous section, we first characterize optimal monetary policy
in the steady state. We then study optimal monetary policy when a negative
productivity shock hits the consumption-good technology at date 0.
2.1 Optimal policy in the steady state
It is easy to see that the public sector optimally sets the policy rate at r∗ = 1
as in the previous section, and commits to refinance entrepreneurs who are
excluded from the market at the same unit LOLR rate, and without any
restriction on quantities. At this unit rate, leveraged share buybacks are
unappealing, and the generous lending of last resort prevents entrepreneurs
from ineﬃciently liquidating assets in order to repay the debt that finances
wages in case they are excluded from the market at the interim date. These
emergency loans can be funded with a lump sum tax on old workers equal
to the amount qw∗l∗ that distressed entrepreneurs owe them.15 The optimal
wage and labor supply to the capital-good sector w∗ and l∗ are defined as
in (6). In sum, the public sector can eliminate liquidity risk at no cost and
implement productive eﬃciency in the steady state.
2.2 Monetary easing
As in Section 1, we now assume that a productivity shock ρ ∈ (0, 1) hits the
consumption-good technology owned by date-0 workers. Whereas this was
immaterial in the previous section, we now assume for simplicity that this
shock is unanticipated by previous cohorts.16
15In addition, all the cohorts of workers but the initial one are rebated the reimburse-
ments of these emergency loans by old entrepreneurs.
16Section 3.6 discusses how the anticipation of this shock would aﬀect the analysis.
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We study the best policy response to this shock. Note first that it is
always optimal to set the policy rate at r∗ = 1 at all other dates than 0,
and to act as a LOLR at this unit rate without restrictions at all other dates
than 1. It cannot be eﬃcient to influence the behavior of the date-0 cohort
of entrepreneurs by distorting investment by the other cohorts, and it is
preferable to directly use the date-0 policy rate and the date-1 LOLR rate.
We thus only need to determine how the public sector optimally sets these
two rates. We denote by r the date-0 policy rate and by Λ the date-1 LOLR
rate, and solve for an optimal policy (r,Λ).
For each ρ ∈ (0, 1] we define r0(ρ) and l0(ρ) as in (7) and (8):
ρg′(1− l0(ρ)) = f ′(l0(ρ)) = r0(ρ)w∗. (11)
The labor supply to entrepreneurs l0(ρ) that corresponds to the first-best
output by the date-0 cohort, f(l0) + ρg(1 − l0), is strictly decreasing in ρ.
The rate r0(ρ) is a strictly increasing function of ρ.
Policy Selection. We will see below that whenever the public sector can
implement the first-best output by the date-0 cohort, there are in general
several policies (r,Λ) that lead to this outcome. These policies imply dif-
ferent distributions of consumption across agents, which is welfare neutral
by assumption. To lift this indeterminacy, we will suppose that the public
sector selects in this case the policy that transfers as little income as possible
from old workers to young entrepreneurs at date-0. This would be the unique
optimal policy if such transfers came at an arbitrarily small cost.
Assumption. (Policy selection) Among all policies (r,Λ) that maximize
the output of the date-0 cohort, the public sector selects the one that mini-
mizes entrepreneurs’ early consumption.
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We now present the important steps of the analysis leading to the optimal
policy (r,Λ), relegating more technical parts to the appendix.
Note first that an entrepreneur who is excluded from the market at date
1 may either tap the LOLR funds, or liquidate its assets. It cannot be
optimal for the public sector to let entrepreneurs liquidate their assets at
date 1. It is socially preferable to grant them emergency lending at the
rate Λ = 1 + λ as it saves ineﬃcient output destruction without aﬀecting
entrepreneurs’ decisions.17 Thus one can without loss of generality restrict
the analysis to the case in which 1 ≤ Λ ≤ 1 + λ and there are no asset
liquidations.
Suppose that a date-0 entrepreneur has one unencumbered unit of the
capital good. Given our assumption that only risk-free debt trades,18 this
entrepreneur can borrow for early consumption against a fraction 1/Λ of this
unit—thereby consuming 1/rΛ when young—and consume from the residual
at date 2 if he has not been excluded from the market at date 1. This
dominates waiting until date 2 to consume the entire unit if and only if:
1
rΛ
+
󰀕
1− 1
Λ
󰀖
(1− q) > 1, (12)
or
r <
1
1 + (Λ− 1)q . (13)
17We show in the appendix that the public sector always has enough fiscal space to do
so at date 1.
18The analysis carries over if entrepreneurs can issue contingent claims.
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The term (Λ− 1)q represents the expected cost of liquidity risk. Define ρ as
r0(ρ) =
1
1 + λq
. (14)
From (13), if ρ ≥ ρ, then the public sector can simply set the policy rate
at r = r0(ρ) and oﬀer emergency lending at the rate Λ = 1 but in rationed
quantities r0(ρ)l0(ρ)w
∗ to each entrepreneur at date 1. This maximizes out-
put and entails that young entrepreneurs do not consume at all at date 0
(they borrow only to fund wages).
Proposition 2. (Monetary response to small productivity shocks)
If ρ ≥ ρ, then the public sector optimally sets the policy rate at r0(ρ) at date
0. It acts as a LOLR at date 1 by lending up to r0(ρ)l0(ρ)w
∗ at a unit rate
to each entrepreneur at date 1.
There are no leveraged share buybacks in equilibrium, and the marginal
date-0 return on capital is equal to the interest rate:
f ′(l0(ρ))
w∗
= r0(ρ). (15)
Proof. See the appendix. 󰃈
Conversely, if ρ < ρ, then the public sector cannot set the date-0 policy
rate at r0(ρ) and ration emergency lending this way. This would induce
share buybacks and ineﬃcient liquidation of excluded entrepreneurs’ assets
at date 1 from condition (13). Attaining the first-best output requires setting
a date-0 policy rate r that induces share buybacks. This is not problematic
per se as long as it does not lead to a binding borrowing constraint for date-0
entrepreneurs. We now determine the values of ρ < ρ for which the first-best
output level can be attained without hitting such a borrowing constraint.
From (12), if a policy (r,Λ) is conducive to share buybacks, a young date-0
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entrepreneur solves if unconstrained:
max
l
󰀝
f(l)
rΛ
+
(Λ− 1)(1− q)f(l)
Λ
− w∗l
󰀞
(16)
The first-order condition reads:
f ′(l) =
rΛw∗
1 + r(Λ− 1)(1− q) . (17)
Condition (10) ensures that the date-0 borrowing of the young entrepreneur
f(l)/rΛ more than covers the wage w∗l. We solve for a policy (r,Λ) that
implements the first-best output while minimizing date-0 entrepreneurs’ de-
mand for funds. Such a policy (r,Λ) solves
min
r,Λ
󰀝
1
rΛ
󰀞
(18)
s.t.
rΛ
1 + r(Λ− 1)(1− q) = r0(ρ), (19)
Λ ≤ 1 + λ. (20)
We show in the appendix that the solution is attained at Λ = 1 + λ and
r = rλ(ρ) defined by
r0(ρ) =
rλ(ρ)(1 + λ)
1 + rλ(ρ)λ(1− q) . (21)
Note that r0(ρ) > rλ(ρ). We show in the appendix that there exists ρ such
that for all ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ], entrepreneurs do not face borrowing constraints when
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the public sector uses this policy (rλ(ρ), 1 + λ).
19 Thus we have for such
intermediate shocks:
Proposition 3. (Monetary response to intermediate productivity
shocks) There exists ρ ≤ ρ such that for all ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ), the public sector can
implement the first-best output, there are leveraged share buybacks at date
0, and emergency lending prevents ineﬃcient liquidation of capital. The
optimal policy consists in setting a date-0 rate rλ(ρ) < r0(ρ). Emergency
lending takes place at a rate 1+λ without any restriction on quantities. The
marginal return on capital is strictly above the date-0 rate:
f ′(l0)
w∗
= r0 > rλ. (22)
Proof. See the appendix. 󰃈
For any ρ ∈ (ρ, ρ), there are a continuum of policies that implement
the first-best. Any policy (r,Λ) such that i) (19) holds and ii) there is no
binding borrowing constraint for date-0 young entrepreneurs implements the
first-best. In addition to the policy that Proposition 3 singles out, there are
policies with higher date-0 rates and lower LOLR rates that satisfy both con-
ditions. In accordance with our assumed selection criterion, the policy that
Proposition 3 selects is the one among those that minimizes entrepreneurs’
borrowing, and thus makes the date-0 borrowing constraint as slack as possi-
ble. All the policies that implement the first-best but this one are eliminated
as ρ decreases suﬃciently: Formally, as ρ ↓ ρ, the set of optimal policies
shrinks until it reduces to the singleton {(rλ(ρ), 1 + λ)} at ρ = ρ.
If the shock is large (ρ < ρ), then any policy (r, 1 + λ) that would im-
plement the first-best output absent borrowing constraint would generate a
19Parameters may be such that ρ = ρ. See proof of Proposition 3 in the appendix for a
formal characterization of this situation.
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borrowing constraint. Hitting such a constraint is very counterproductive
as a constrained entrepreneur allocates his borrowing capacity B between
investment w∗l and early consumption B − w∗l so as to maximize, up to a
constant,
f(l) +B − w∗l (23)
and thus chooses l such that
f ′(l) = w∗. (24)
Thus investment snaps back to the non-stimulated level. As a result, the
public sector cannot implement the first-best output level. It cannot do
better than the policy (rλ(ρ), 1 + λ).
Proposition 4. (Monetary response to large productivity shocks)
If ρ < ρ, then the public sector cannot implement the first-best output level.
It cannot spur more investment than the optimal level f(l0(ρ)) corresponding
to a policy rate rλ(ρ). There are leveraged share buybacks and emergency
lending at a punitive rate 1+λ. If the public sector mistakenly sets the date-
0 rate at a level below rλ(ρ), then investment snaps back to the steady-state
level f(l∗).
Proof. See the appendix. 󰃈
In this case in which the shock is so large that the first-best is out of
reach, the optimal policy is unique. It exhibits an endogenous lower bound
rλ(r) below which monetary accommodation is counterproductive as carry
trades crowd out investment.20 It is worthwhile stressing that entrepreneurs
20That this bound rλ(r) is smaller than 1 is only due to the normalization of the growth
rate of the economy and of entrepreneurs’ intertemporal rate of substitution to 1.
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are individually unconstrained at this lower bound rλ(ρ) in the sense that
their investment/consumption problem admits an interior solution.
To be sure, a rational public sector should never set the policy rate be-
low the level rλ(ρ) that triggers credit-market disequilibrium, entrepreneurs’
rationing, and a contraction of investment to non-stimulated levels. In an
open-economy extension of the model, such interest-rate levels could how-
ever be induced by capital flowing out of economies in which the rate is
below rλ(ρ). Plantin and Shin (2018) study such situations of destabilizing
monetary spillovers.
Figure 3 summarizes the findings in Propositions 2, 3, and 4:
Figure 3: Optimal policy and equilibrium patterns as the date-0 shock varies 
⇢0
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•  Optimal policy implements 
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•  No leveraged share 
buybacks in equilibrium 
•  Marginal return on capital 
equals interest rate 
•  Optimal policy implements 
first-best output 
•  Leveraged share buybacks in 
equilibrium 
•  Marginal return on capital 
larger than interest rate 
•  Optimal policy                 cannot 
implement first-best output 
•  Leveraged share buybacks in 
equilibrium 
•  Marginal return on capital larger 
than interest rate 
•  Investment shrinks if rate below   
1⇢
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For small shocks (ρ ≥ ρ), the output is at its first-best level, liquid-
ity risk discourages share buybacks, and the marginal return on capital is
equal to the interest rate. Such an implementation of the first-best with-
out share buybacks for early consumption is out of reach as shocks become
larger (ρ < ρ). In this case, as claimed in the introduction, we predict that
monetary accommodation induces excessive maturity transformation, and
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indiﬀerence between share buybacks and capital expenditures at the margin
despite a wedge between interest rate and marginal return on capital that
actually reflects liquidity risk. Interestingly these patterns are not necessar-
ily a symptom of ineﬃcient investment. They may arise even if investment
is at the first-best (case ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ)). If parameters are however such that
ρ = ρ, then this intermediate region vanishes and entrepreneurs enter into
leveraged share buybacks exactly in the situations in which investment is
below the first-best level, that is, for any ρ < ρ = ρ.
The role of asset liquidity. It is transparent from (14) that the thresh-
old ρ above which there are no leveraged share buybacks in equilibrium is
decreasing in λ. As capital is less liquid, it takes a lower policy rate to
make carry trades profitable. We show in the proof of Proposition 3 that
the second threshold ρ, below which aggregate borrowing is constrained and
investment is suboptimal, is also decreasing in λ. Higher liquidation costs
reduce the amount f(l0)/(1 + λ) against which shares are bought back and
thus eases financial constraints. In sum, large liquidation costs make it easier
for the public sector to stimulate investment by deterring socially ineﬃcient
financial risk taking.
3 Extensions
3.1 Explicit modelling of shadow banks
As mentioned above, “entrepreneurs” in our model aggregate both the shadow-
banking sector and non-financial firms for expositional simplicity. All our re-
sults carry over if we split entrepreneurs into these two categories of agents for
more realism. Suppose for example that a subset of entrepreneurs—firms—
have access to the capital-producing technology but cannot tap workers. The
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residual entrepreneurs—shadow banks—cannot produce but they can inter-
mediate between workers and firms subject to rollover risk. Competitive
shadow banks make zero profit by borrowing short-term from workers in or-
der to fund firms’ investments and leveraged share buybacks (if any). Firms
issue long-term bonds underwritten by shadow banks. We now interpret λ
as the cost for a shadow bank of refinancing such long-term bonds with other
shadow banks if it is excluded from retail markets at the interim date.21 It is
easy to see that the analysis is then unchanged. Shadow banks charge firms
a spread that reflect the expected costs associated with rollover risk. Firms
therefore face the exact same cost of funds as in the baseline model and have
the same demand for funds. In particular, they enter into leveraged share
buybacks under the same circumstances (ρ ≤ ρ).
3.2 Political-economy constraints
The goal of the paper is to present a novel explanation for the low invest-
ment and high payouts induced by monetary easing in the simplest possible
framework with a minimum set of ingredients. In particular the absence of
any costs to workers’ taxation or entrepreneurs’ bailouts, and a social objec-
tive ignoring redistributive issues imply that the first-best output fails to be
implemented only when entrepreneurs’ demand for loans exceeds the entire
supply of funds in the economy. This is an extreme view that stacks the deck
against obtaining our endogenous lower bound.
It is straightforward to add to this setup a constraint on the magnitude
of the transfer from old workers towards young entrepreneurs at date 0—for
example as a fraction of workers’ pre-tax income. The tighter the constraint,
21The institutions involved in the rescue may for example not be able to extract as much
from the lending relationship as the original lender.
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the higher the threshold ρ below which the first-best output is out of reach.
On the other hand, the threshold ρ would not be aﬀected by such a constraint
since it is determined by the expected return on carry trades only (by (14)).
So a tighter redistributive constraint makes it more likely that ρ = ρ other
things being equal, in which case the optimal policy either implements the
first-best output without any carry trades (case ρ ≥ ρ corresponding to
Proposition 2) or fails to implement the first-best (case ρ < ρ corresponding
to Proposition 4).
3.3 Prudential regulation
An important ingredient of our model is the assumption that the public sec-
tor cannot keep a check on leverage in the private sector. Using for brevity
the elementary model sketched in the introduction, this section shows that
the appropriate combination of a policy rate and a prudential regulation for
entrepreneurs can implement investment levels beyond 1/R2 without induc-
ing leveraged share buybacks.22 Suppose thus that in this model, the public
sector can enforce an interest rate r and a capital requirement stipulating
that entrepreneurs cannot borrow beyond a fraction ∆ of their total asset
22The interest rates that induce investment below 1/R2 are not conducive to leveraged
share buybacks even in the unregulated case studied in the introduction.
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value. Subject to such a capital requirement, entrepreneurs then solve:
min
B,I
󰁱
c0 +
c1
R
󰁲
(25)
s.t. c0 + I ≤ B, (26)
c1 + rB ≤ 2
√
I, (27)
B ≤ 2∆
√
I
r
, (28)
c0 ≥ 0. (29)
The variables B and I respectively denote total borrowing and investment by
entrepreneurs. The case ∆ = 1 corresponds to the unregulated case studied
in the introduction. (In this case (28) simply imposes that c1 be positive.)
Proposition 5. (Prudential regulation curbs ineﬃcient risk-taking)
The public sector can implement investment I ∈ [1/R2, 4/R2) without trig-
gering any leveraged share buybacks (B = I) by setting (r,∆) such that:
∆
r
=
1
r +R
=
√
I
2
. (30)
Proof. See the appendix. 󰃈
Condition (30) shows that the policy rate r unsurprisingly decreases with
respect to I. The capital requirement becomes in turn tighter as monetary
policy is more accommodative: ∆ decreases with I. Intuitively, inframarginal
productivity is larger than r and so unconstrained debt capacity grows faster
than investment I as r decreases. A tightening capital requirement keeps this
debt capacity at the minimum level B = I that allows for optimal investment
but not for early consumption.
An interesting route for future research consists in studying the interme-
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diate situation in which the regulation of leverage—or/and the taxation of
entrepreneurs’ capital/consumption—can only be imperfectly enforced, and
examining the interplay of such imperfect enforcement with the crowding out
of investment by financial risk-taking highlighted here.23
3.4 Asset purchases
An important component of the post 2008 unconventional monetary policy
is the purchase of mortgage-backed securities by the Federal Reserve. In our
setup, such private-asset purchases would correspond to a swap between the
public sector and the entrepreneurs of units of the capital good for public
bonds akin to remunerated excess reserves (although reserves have an indef-
inite maturity whereas the public liabilities last one-period here). Such a
swap could be an alternative way to spur investment at date 0. If the public
sector kept the date-0 policy rate at r∗ = 1 (for example because this is an
exogenous lower bound given the alternative storages available, as is the case
with the zero lower bound in practice) but accepted to trade 1/r0 bonds for
each unit of capital produced at date 0, then this would also generate the
first-best output without triggering any excess demand of funds due to carry
trades at date 0. But the risk that such an excess demand of funds arises
is only postponed to date 1 under this alternative policy, as overpaying for
private assets creates the same need to transfer funds from old workers to
young entrepreneurs once the public bonds mature at date 1.
23Plantin (2015) develops a model of leverage regulation under imperfect enforcement.
Landier and Plantin (2017) oﬀer a model of optimal capital taxation under imperfect
enforcement.
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3.5 Interim consumption by entrepreneurs
The assumption that entrepreneurs also value consumption when middle-
aged would reinforce our results by further weakening the link between inter-
est rate and productive investment. To see this, note that the fraction (1−q)
of date-0 middle-aged entrepreneurs who are not excluded from markets at
date 0 would borrow against their date-1 profit without taking any liquidity
risk in the face of a date-0 interest-rate cut. This would suck more investable
funds out of productive investment, and the public sector would have no way
to prevent this with punitive emergency rates given the absence of maturity
transformation. More generally, if entrepreneurs were living n periods and
capital goods delivered consumption over the same horizon, then a stock of
legacy assets produced by the (n − 1) previous cohorts would lend them-
selves to carry trades that are less risky than that against newly produced
(and thus longer-lived) assets at date 0. These carry trades would absorb a
lot of date-0 savings and dramatically amplify the diversion of savings away
from productive investment.
3.6 Anticipated productivity shock
If the date-0 productivity shock is perceived as suﬃciently likely by date-
(−1) entrepreneurs, then this adds another cost from a date-0 rate cut. The
anticipation of such a cut would induce them to excessively invest, and pos-
sibly to enter into leveraged share buybacks if the probability of the cut is
suﬃciently large. Their refinancing at date 0 would drain more funds away
from date-0 investment and thus put more constraints on productive invest-
ment at this date. Overall, the first-best would not be reached over a larger
parameter range and the public sector would have to trade oﬀ the desirable
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distortions created for the date-0 cohort with the unintended ones created
for the previous one.
4 Concluding remarks
Our attempt in this paper has been to embed financial-stability concerns in
a workhorse model of the interest-rate channel of monetary policy. We study
an economy in which i) the intertemporal rate of substitution of agents with
the highest borrowing capacity in the economy exceeds the policy rate, ii) the
public sector has limited control over maturity transformation by the private
sector. Under these circumstances, monetary easing triggers a large amount
of financial risk-taking at the expense of capital expenditures. Financial risk-
taking is a socially costly rent extraction by entrepreneurs. The model gives
a compact explanation for the increase in maturity transformation and share
buybacks that has accompanied the recent phases of monetary easing, to-
gether with limited investment despite a wedge between the marginal return
on capital and interest rate.
There are many directions in which we could extend our analysis fruit-
fully. For example, we could introduce uncertainty to the duration of the
productivity shock experienced by the economy over time (instead of a one-
period shock) whereby monetary easing may continue for several periods and
then be tightened at the cost of unwinding of financial sector carry-trades.
Carry trades would then potentially build up in the economy over an ex-
tended period of monetary easing and face an endogenous rollover risk when
rates rise. Adding such a feature to the model would allow us to relate in a
better fashion to phenomena in asset markets and financial flows as observed
during the “taper tantrum” in 2013 (Feroli et al. 2014).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
For ρ ≥ ρ , (13) implies that a date-0 rate r0(ρ) is such that entrepreneurs find
liquidity risk too high to enter into share buybacks if they have to liquidate
assets in case of market exclusion. The public sector thus only needs to ration
its emergency lending so that entrepreneurs borrow only to fund investment
and not to buy shares back when the LOLR rate is 1. Since entrepreneurs
borrow only wages from young workers they are not constrained at date 0.
Furthermore, there are no borrowing constraints at date 1. We have indeed
at this date 1:
• Pre-tax (and thus taxable) income of old workers:
r0ρg(1− l0) + r0w∗l0 (31)
• Funds invested in public bonds by young workers:
g(1− l∗)󰁿 󰁾󰁽 󰂀
Income not lent to young entrepreneurs
− (1− q)r0w∗l0󰁿 󰁾󰁽 󰂀
Refinancing of
middle-aged entrepreneurs
(32)
• Maturing public liabilities:
r0[ρg(1− l0)− (1− q)w∗l∗] + qr0w∗l0 − qw∗l∗ (33)
The first term in (33) states that young date-0 workers invested ρg(1 −
l0)− (1− q)w∗l∗ in public bonds at date 0. The second term represents the
emergency funding to distressed middle-aged entrepreneurs. The third term
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is the reimbursement by old entrepreneurs of the emergency funding that
they received when distressed at date 0.
No agent is constrained at date 1 if the public sector can balance its
budget, or if (31) + (32) ≥ (33), which always holds. 󰃈
Proof of Proposition 3
As stated in the body of the paper, implementing the first-best output while
minimizing young entrepreneurs’ consumption at date 0 amounts to solving:
min
r,Λ
󰀝
1
rΛ
󰀞
(34)
s.t.
rΛw∗
1 + r(Λ− 1)(1− q) = r0(ρ), (35)
Λ ≤ 1 + λ. (36)
That 1 > r(1− q) implies that the left hand side (l.h.s.) of (35) is increasing
in rΛ holding r fixed. It is also clearly increasing in r holding rΛ fixed. So
the largest feasible rΛ that satisfies this equality corresponds to the smallest
r and in turn to the largest feasible value of Λ, 1 + λ. This implies that the
policy rate is r = rλ(ρ) defined by
r0(ρ) =
rλ(ρ)(1 + λ)
1 + rλ(ρ)λ(1− q) > rλ(ρ). (37)
This latter inequality reflects the wedge between the marginal return on
capital and the interest rate.
We now show that given this policy, date-0 borrowing by entrepreneurs
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exceeds the date-0 supply of loanable funds when ρ is below a threshold ρ .
For a date-0 rate rλ, we have at date 0:
• Pre-tax income of old workers (=proceeds from having invested their
date-(−1) income at rate 1):
g(1− l∗) + w∗l∗ (38)
• Funds invested in public bonds by young workers:
ρg(1− l0) + w∗l0󰁿 󰁾󰁽 󰂀
Profits and labor income
− (1− q)w∗l∗󰁿 󰁾󰁽 󰂀
Refinancing of
middle-aged entrepreneurs
− f(l0)
rλ(1 + λ)󰁿 󰁾󰁽 󰂀
Loans to
young entrepreneurs
(39)
• Maturing public liabilities:
g(1− l∗)− (1− q)w∗l∗ + qw∗l∗ − qw∗l∗ (40)
The term g(1 − l∗) − (1 − q)w∗l∗ in (40) stems from the fact that
young workers’ investment in public bonds at date −1 is their total
income g(1 − l∗) + w∗l∗ net of loans to young entrepreneurs w∗l and
refinancing of middle-aged entrepreneurs (1 − q)w∗l∗. The two other
terms cancel out as they represent the emergency lending to middle-
aged entrepreneurs net of the reimbursement by old entrepreneurs of
the date-(−1) emergency funds (lent at a unit rate).
The date-0 borrowing constraint binds when maturing liabilities exceed tax-
able income and investment in public bonds:
(38) + (39) ≤ (40), (41)
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and re-arranging yields
f(l0)
(1 + λ)rλ
− w∗l0 ≥ w∗l∗ + ρg(1− l0). (42)
This is intuitive: the l.h.s. is the amount that date-0 young entrepreneurs
seek to borrow beyond the financing of wages, and the right-hand side fea-
tures the investable funds of young workers ρg(1− l0) and the amount that
firms owe to old workers which is taxable w∗l∗. From the definition of rλ,
this is equivalent to
f(l0)
r0
− w∗l0 ≥ ρg(1− l0) + λ(1− q)f(l0)
1 + λ
+ w∗l∗. (43)
From the envelope theorem, the derivative of the left-hand side of (43) w.r.t.
ρ is
− f(l0)
r20
dr0
dρ
≤ 0, (44)
whereas that of the right-hand side is
g(1− l0)− ρg′(1− l0)dl0
dρ
1 + λq
1 + λ
≥ 0. (45)
This implies that the borrowing constraint binds if and only if ρ is below a
threshold ρ, possibly equal to ρ if (43) does not hold at ρ = ρ. A simple
inspection of (43) shows that this threshold ρ is decreasing in λ.
Finally, there are no borrowing constraints at date 1. We have at this
date:
• Income of old workers (=Proceeds from having invested their date-0
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income at rate r0):
r0ρg(1− l0) + r0w∗l0 (46)
• Funds invested in public bonds by young workers:
g(1− l∗)󰁿 󰁾󰁽 󰂀
Income not lent to entrepreneurs
− (1− q)f(l0)
1 + λ󰁿 󰁾󰁽 󰂀
Refinancing of
middle-aged entrepreneurs
(47)
• Maturing public liabilities:
r0
󰀗
ρg(1− l0) + w∗l0 − (1− q)w∗l∗ − f(l0)
r0(1 + λ)
󰀘
+
qf(l0)
1 + λ
− qw∗l∗
(48)
Again, the first-term is the repayment of public bonds purchased at
date-0 by young workers, with their total income net of loans to young
entrepreneurs and distressed middle-aged ones. The second term are
emergency loans to distressed middle-aged entrepreneurs. The third
term is the repayment of emergency loans by old entrepreneurs.
No agent is constrained at date 1 if the public sector can balance its
budget, or if (46) + (47) ≥ (48), which always holds. 󰃈
Proof of Proposition 4
By construction of ρ, if ρ < ρ, it is impossible to implement the first-best
output, or in fact any output larger than the one associated with the policy
(rλ(ρ), 1+ λ) without triggering a borrowing constraint and thus investment
at the non-stimulated level. 󰃈
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Proof of Proposition 5
That I > 1/R2 implies that r < R and so (28) is optimally binding: en-
trepreneurs maximize early consumption. Together with a binding condition
(26) this yields a first-order condition for investment:
√
I =
∆
r
+
1−∆
R.
(49)
Imposing that B = 2∆
√
I/r equal I implies
√
I = 2∆/r, which combined
with (49) and re-arranged yields relations (30).
Note that for higher levels of investment I ≥ 4/R2, implementing B = I
is out of reach. It is possible to get arbitrarily close to the lower bound for
B defined as
B − I
I
= 1− 2
R
√
I
(50)
by setting ∆ and r arbitrarily small and ∆/r =
√
I − 1/R. 󰃈
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